DEXA '03 Proceedings of the 14th International Workshop on Database and Expert Systems Applications
Terra: a virtual machine-based platform for trusted computing
SOSP '03 Proceedings of the nineteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Peer-to-peer access control architecture using trusted computing technology
Proceedings of the tenth ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
The Architecture of Virtual Machines
Computer
Multi-Level Security Requirements for Hypervisors
ACSAC '05 Proceedings of the 21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Information Systems Frontiers
Trust '08 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Trusted Computing and Trust in Information Technologies: Trusted Computing - Challenges and Applications
Improving the scalability of platform attestation
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Scalable trusted computing
A trusted decentralized access control framework for the client/server architecture
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
Platform for enterprise privacy practices: privacy-enabled management of customer data
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Trusted integrity measurement and reporting for virtualized platforms
INTRUST'09 Proceedings of the First international conference on Trusted Systems
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For the proper provision of online services, service providers need to collect some personal data from their customers; for instance, an address is collected in order to deliver goods to the right customer. Here the service provider and customer are called data collector (DC) and data subject (DS) respectively. After receiving the personal data, the DC is free to use them as he likes: he may process them for purposes which are not consented by the DS, and even share them with third parties (TPs). Researchers have paid attention to this problem, but previously proposed solutions do not guarantee that, after they have been disclosed to DCs, personal data can only be used as specified by DSs. These solutions require good behaving DCs and assume that DCs' behavior is verifiable, but do not actually show what happens after DCs get the data. In this paper, we propose a solution that guarantees this by enforcing sticky policies along communication chains composed of a DS, a DC and one (or more) TPs. Our solution uses trusted platform modules (TPMs) and virtual machines (VMs).