Computationally sound symbolic analysis of EAP-TNC protocol

Authors:
Zijian Zhang;Liehuang Zhu;Feng Wang;Lejian Liao;Cong Guo;Hongyuan Wang
Affiliations:
Beijing Key Lab of Intelligent Information Technology, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing, China;Beijing Key Lab of Intelligent Information Technology, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing, China;Naval Academy of Armament, Beijing, China;Beijing Key Lab of Intelligent Information Technology, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing, China;Beijing Key Lab of Intelligent Information Technology, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing, China;Beijing Key Lab of Intelligent Information Technology, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing, China
Venue:
INTRUST'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Trusted Systems
Year:
2011

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Abstract

The Trusted Computing Group has proposed Trusted Network Connection (TNC) Architecture and a series of interface specifications, such as IF-T and IF-TNCCS, to solve the interoperability of network access control. In particular, IF-T describes the mapping of IF-TNCCS messages to a standard TNC Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) method. It includes specification of the standard EAP method called EAP-TNC. Since EAP-TNC is important to encapsulate TNCCS messages so that they can be carried over tunneled EAP methods, this paper proposes a computationally sound symbolic analysis of EAP-TNC protocol to prove composable security property.