Verifying cryptographic code in c: some experience and the csec challenge

Authors:
Mihhail Aizatulin;François Dupressoir;Andrew D. Gordon;Jan Jürjens
Affiliations:
The Open University, UK;The Open University, UK;Microsoft Research and University of Edinburgh, UK;TU Dortmund and Fraunhofer ISST, Germany
Venue:
FAST'11 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Formal Aspects of Security and Trust
Year:
2011

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Abstract

The security of much critical infrastructure depends in part on cryptographic software coded in C, and yet vulnerabilities continue to be discovered in such software. We describe recent progress on checking the security of C code implementing cryptographic software. In particular, we describe projects that combine verification-condition generation and symbolic execution techniques for C, with methods for stating and verifying security properties of abstract models of cryptographic protocols. We illustrate these techniques on C code for a simple two-message protocol.