From model-checking to automated testing of security protocols: bridging the gap

  • Authors:
  • Alessandro Armando;Giancarlo Pellegrino;Roberto Carbone;Alessio Merlo;Davide Balzarotti

  • Affiliations:
  • DIST, Università degli Studi di Genova, Italy,Security & Trust Unit, FBK-irst, Trento, Italy;Institute Eurecom, Sophia Antipolis, France,SAP Research, Mougins, France;Security & Trust Unit, FBK-irst, Trento, Italy;DIST, Università degli Studi di Genova, Italy,Università Telematica E-Campus, Italy;Institute Eurecom, Sophia Antipolis, France

  • Venue:
  • TAP'12 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Tests and Proofs
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

Model checkers have been remarkably successful in finding flaws in security protocols. In this paper we present an approach to binding specifications of security protocols to actual implementations and show how it can be effectively used to automatically test implementations against putative attack traces found by the model checker. By using our approach we have been able to automatically detect and reproduce an attack witnessing an authentication flaw in the SAML-based Single Sign-On for Google Apps.