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Approximated Computationally Bounded Simulation Relations for Probabilistic Automata
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Computer-aided security proofs for the working cryptographer
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ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part II
Probabilistic relational reasoning for differential privacy
POPL '12 Proceedings of the 39th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
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QEST'13 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Quantitative Evaluation of Systems
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Provable security. The goal of provable security is to verify rigorously the security of cryptographic systems. A provable security argument proceeds in three steps: 1 Define a security goal and an adversarial model; 2 Define the cryptographic system and the security assumptions upon which the security of the system hinges; 3Show by reduction that any attack against the cryptographic system can be used to build an efficient algorithm that breaks a security assumption.