A set-based approach to negotiation with concessions

  • Authors:
  • Costin Bădică;Amelia Bădică

  • Affiliations:
  • University of Craiova, Craiova, Romania;University of Craiova, Craiova, Romania

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the Fifth Balkan Conference in Informatics
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

Concessions made to opponents are a well-known mechanism for self-improving your own negotiation position towards reaching an agreement in bilateral and multilateral negotiation. Probably the best well-known negotiation protocol that employs concessions is the Monotonic Concession Protocol (MCP). In this paper we propose a generalization of the bilateral MCP negotiation protocol by conceptualizing agent preferences and offers using sets of deals.