Logics of time and computation
Logics of time and computation
Intention is choice with commitment
Artificial Intelligence
Handbook of theoretical computer science (vol. B)
Handbook of theoretical computer science (vol. B)
A guide to completeness and complexity for modal logics of knowledge and belief
Artificial Intelligence
Artificial Intelligence
Handbook of logic in computer science (vol. 2)
Communications of the ACM
Agents that reduce work and information overload
Communications of the ACM
COACH: a teaching agent that learns
Communications of the ACM
Guarantees for autonomy in cognitive agent architecture
ECAI-94 Proceedings of the workshop on agent theories, architectures, and languages on Intelligent agents
IJCAI '95 Proceedings of the workshop on Intelligent agents II : agent theories, architectures, and languages: agent theories, architectures, and languages
The dynamics of default reasoning
Data & Knowledge Engineering
An axiomatic basis for computer programming
Communications of the ACM
Axiomatising the Logic of Computer Programming
Axiomatising the Logic of Computer Programming
Epistemic Logic for AI and Computer Science
Epistemic Logic for AI and Computer Science
KI '94 Proceedings of the 18th Annual German Conference on Artificial Intelligence: Advances in Artificial Intelligence
A model-theoretic approach to the verification of situated reasoning systems
IJCAI'93 Proceedings of the 13th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence - Volume 1
Asymmetry thesis and side-effect problems in linear-time and branching-time intention logics
IJCAI'91 Proceedings of the 12th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
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We present a formal system to reason about and specify the behavior of multiple intelligent artificial agents. Essentially, each agent can perform certain actions, and it may possess a variety of information in order to reason about its and other agent's actions. Thus, our KARO-framework tries to deal formally with the notion of Knowledge, possessed by the agents, and their possible execution of actions. In particular, each agent may reason about its —or, alternatively, other's— Abilities to perform certain actions, the possible Results of such an execution and the availability of the Opportunities to take a particular action. Formally, we combine dynamic and epistemic logic into one modal system, and add the notion of ability to it. We demonstrate that there are several options to define the ability to perform a sequentially composed action, and we outline several properties under two alternative choices. Also, the agents' views on the correctness and feasibility of their plans are highlighted. Finally, the complications in the completeness proof for both systems indicate that the presence of abilities in the logic makes the use of infinite proof rules useful, if not inevitable.