Mersenne twister: a 623-dimensionally equidistributed uniform pseudo-random number generator
ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation (TOMACS) - Special issue on uniform random number generation
A Practical Attack on Broadcast RC4
FSE '01 Revised Papers from the 8th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Computer Vision and Image Understanding
LIBLINEAR: A Library for Large Linear Classification
The Journal of Machine Learning Research
Plaintext Recovery Attacks against SSH
SP '09 Proceedings of the 2009 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
LIBSVM: A library for support vector machines
ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology (TIST)
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Cryptographic distinguishing attacks, in which the attacker is able to extract enough "information" from an encrypted message to distinguish it from a piece of random data, allow for powerful cryptanalysis both in theory and in practice. In this paper, we report our experience of applying state-of-the-art machine learning techniques to launch cryptographic distinguishing attacks on several public datasets. We try several kinds of existing and new features on these datasets and find that the ciphers' "modes of operation" dominate the performance of classification tasks. When CBC mode is used with a random initial vector for each plaintext, the performance is extremely bad, while the performance for certain datasets is relatively good when ECB mode is used. We conclude that, in contrary to the findings of several existing works, the state-of-the-art machine learning techniques cannot extract useful information from ciphertexts produced by modern ciphers operating in a reasonably secure mode such as CBC, let alone distinguish them from random data.