Mobile values, new names, and secure communication
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IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Let me answer that for you: exploiting broadcast information in cellular networks
SEC'13 Proceedings of the 22nd USENIX conference on Security
SE-AKA: A secure and efficient group authentication and key agreement protocol for LTE networks
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
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Mobile telephony equipment is daily carried by billions of subscribers everywhere they go. Avoiding linkability of subscribers by third parties, and protecting the privacy of those subscribers is one of the goals of mobile telecommunication protocols. We use formal methods to model and analyse the security properties of 3G protocols. We expose two novel threats to the user privacy in 3G telephony systems, which make it possible to trace and identify mobile telephony subscribers, and we demonstrate the feasibility of a low cost implementation of these attacks. We propose fixes to these privacy issues, which also take into account and solve other privacy attacks known from the literature. We successfully prove that our privacy-friendly fixes satisfy the desired unlinkability and anonymity properties using the automatic verification tool ProVerif.