A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
Robust key generation from signal envelopes in wireless networks
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
On the effectiveness of secret key extraction from wireless signal strength in real environments
Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Robust uncorrelated bit extraction methodologies for wireless sensors
Proceedings of the 9th ACM/IEEE International Conference on Information Processing in Sensor Networks
Information-theoretically secret key generation for fading wireless channels
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Secure wireless communication with dynamic secrets
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
The Wiretap Channel With Feedback: Encryption Over the Channel
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Secret key agreement by public discussion from common information
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Creating secrets out of erasures
Proceedings of the 19th annual international conference on Mobile computing & networking
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Current security systems typically rely on the adversary's computational limitations (e.g., the fact that it cannot invert a hash function or perform large-integer factorization). Wireless networks offer the opportunity for a different, complementary kind of security, which relies not on the adversary's computational limitations, but on its limited network presence (i.e., that the adversary cannot be located at many different points in the network at the same time). We take a first step toward designing and building a wireless security system that leverages this opportunity: We consider the problem where a group of n nodes, connected to the same broadcast wireless network, want to agree on a shared secret (e.g., an encryption key), in the presence of an adversary Eve who tries to listen in and steal the secret. We propose a secret-agreement protocol, where the n nodes of the group keep exchanging bits until they have all agreed on a bit sequence that Eve cannot reconstruct (with very high probability). We provide experimental evidence---to the best of our knowledge, the first one---that a group of wireless nodes can generate thousands of new shared secret bits per second, with their secrecy being independent of the adversary's computational capabilities.