Wolf attack probability: a new security measure in biometric authentication systems

Authors:
Masashi Une;Akira Otsuka;Hideki Imai
Affiliations:
Center for Information Technology Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Tokyo, Japan;National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology, Chiyoda, Tokyo, Japan;National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology, Chiyoda and Faculty of Science and Engineering, Chuo University, Tokyo, Japan
Venue:
ICB'07 Proceedings of the 2007 international conference on Advances in Biometrics
Year:
2007

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Abstract

This paper will propose a wolf attack probability (WAP) as a new measure for evaluating security of biometric authentication systems. The wolf attack is an attempt to impersonate a victim by feeding "wolves" into the system to be attacked. The "wolf" means an input value which can be falsely accepted as a match with multiple templates. WAP is defined as a maximum success probability of the wolf attack with one wolf sample. In this paper, we give a rigorous definition of the new security measure which gives strengh estimation of an individual biometric authentication system against impersonation attacks. We show that if one reestimates using our WAP measure, a typical fingerprint algorithm is turned out to be much weaker than theoretically estimated by Ratha et al. Moreover, we apply the wolf attack to a finger-vein-pattern matching algorithm. Surprisingly, we show that there exists an extremely strong wolf which falsely matches all templates for any threshold values.