Safeware: system safety and computers
Safeware: system safety and computers
Safety Critical Computer Systems
Safety Critical Computer Systems
Combining software evidence: arguments and assurance
REBSE '05 Proceedings of the 2005 workshop on Realising evidence-based software engineering
Applying Safety Goals to a New Intensive Care Workstation System
SAFECOMP '08 Proceedings of the 27th international conference on Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security
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The upcoming safety standard ISO/WD 26262 that has been derived from the more general IEC 61508 and adapted for the automotive industry, introduces the concept of a safety case, a scheme that has already been successfully applied in other sectors of industry such as nuclear, defense, aerospace, and railway. A safety case communicates a clear, comprehensive and defensible argument that a system is acceptably safe in its operating context. Although, the standard prescribes that there should be a safety argument, it does not establish detailed guidelines on how such an argument should be organized and implemented, or which artifacts should be provided. In this paper, we introduce a methodology and a tool chain for establishing a safety argument, plus the evidence to prove the argument, as a concrete reference realization of the ISO/WD 26262 for automotive systems. We use the Goal-Structuring-Notation to decompose and refine safety claims of an emergency braking system (EBS) for trucks into sub-claims until they can be proven by evidence. The evidence comes from tracing the safety requirements of the system into their respective development artifacts in which they are realized.