Efficient password-based authenticated key exchange without public information

  • Authors:
  • Jun Shao;Zhenfu Cao;Licheng Wang;Rongxing Lu

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University;Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University;Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University;Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Waterloo

  • Venue:
  • ESORICS'07 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Research in Computer Security
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

Since the first password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE) was proposed, it has enjoyed a considerable amount of interest from the cryptographic research community. To our best knowledge, most of proposed PAKEs based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange need some public information, such as generators of a finite cyclic group. However, in a client-server environment, not all servers use the same public information, which demands clients authenticate those public information before beginning PAKE. It is cumbersome for users. What's worse, it may bring some secure problems with PAKE, such as substitution attack. To remove these problems, in this paper, we present an efficient password-based authenticated key exchange protocol without any public information. We also provide a formal security analysis in the nonconcurrent setting, including basic security, mutual authentication, and forward secrecy, by using the random oracle model.