One-more extension of paillier inversion problem and concurrent secure identification

  • Authors:
  • Yan Song

  • Affiliations:
  • State Key Lab. of Computer Science, Institute of Software and Graduate University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

  • Venue:
  • EuroPKI'07 Proceedings of the 4th European conference on Public Key Infrastructure: theory and practice
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

In this paper, we revisit Paillier's trapdoor one-way function [15], focusing on the computational problem underlying its one-wayness. We formulate a new computational problem that we call one-more Paillier inversion problem. It is a natural extension of Paillier inversion problem to the setting where adversaries have access to an inversion oracle and a challenge oracle. We study the relation between the proposed problem and the one-more RSA inversion problem introduced by Bellare et al. in [2]; we prove that the one-more Paillier inversion problem is hard if and only if the one-more RSA inversion problem is hard. Then we propose a new identification scheme; we show the assumed hardness of the one-more Paillier inversion problem leads to a proof that the proposed identification scheme achieves security against concurrent impersonation attack. Compared with the known RSA-related identification schemes, the proposed identification scheme is only slightly inefficient than the best known GQ scheme, but is more efficient than Okamoto's.