A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
Parameter Selection for Server-Aided RSA Computation Schemes
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Speeding Up Secret Computations with Insecure Auxiliary Devices
CRYPTO '88 Proceedings of the 8th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Security and Performance of Server-Aided RSA Computation Protocols
CRYPTO '95 Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Fast Server-Aided RSA Signatures Secure Against Active Attacks
CRYPTO '95 Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
On Verifiable Implicit Asking Protocols for RSA Computation
ASIACRYPT '92 Proceedings of the Workshop on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Generating RSA Keys on a Handheld Using an Untrusted Server
INDOCRYPT '00 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Progress in Cryptology
The Béguin-Quisquater Server-Aided RSA Protocol from Crypto '95 is not Secure
ASIACRYPT '98 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Riemann's hypothesis and tests for primality
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Attacks on protocols for server-aided RSA computation
EUROCRYPT'92 Proceedings of the 11th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Security analysis of a server-aided RSA key generation protocol
ISPEC'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Information Security Practice and Experience
Server-aided RSA key generation against collusion attack
MADNES'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Secure Mobile Ad-hoc Networks and Sensors
Fast server-aided secret computation protocols for modular exponentiation
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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At MADNES 2005, Y. Chen et al. proposed two improved server-aided RSA key generation protocols, which are claimed to be secure against collusion attack. However, at ISPEC 2006, T. Cao et al. presented a collusion attack on Chen's standard server-aided RSA key generation protocol and can get the plaintext from a ciphertext. In this paper, we propose a full cryptanalysis of Chen's two server-aided RSA key generation protocols. Firstly, we give a further analysis of Chen's standard protocol and can recover the factorization of the RSA modulus N with the complexity O(log3(N)). Secondly, we propose two collusion attacks on Chen's unbalanced RSA key generation protocol. It is proved that we can decrypt any ciphertext with the complexity O(log3(N)) and find the secret prime p with the complexity O(log4(N)). Therefore, neither of Chen's two server-aided RSA key generation protocols can resist collusion attack.