The security of elastic block ciphers against key-recovery attacks

  • Authors:
  • Debra L. Cook;Moti Yung;Angelos D. Keromytis

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer Science, Columbia University, New York, NY;Department of Computer Science, Columbia University, New York, NY;Department of Computer Science, Columbia University, New York, NY

  • Venue:
  • ISC'07 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Information Security
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

We analyze the security of elastic block ciphers against key-recovery attacks. An elastic version of a fixed-length block cipher is a variable-length block cipher that supports any block size in the range of one to two times the length of the original block. Our method for creating an elastic block cipher involves inserting the round function of the original cipher into a substitution-permutation network. In this paper, we form a polynomial-time reduction between the elastic and original versions of the cipher by exploiting the underlying network structure. We prove that the elastic version of a cipher is secure against a given key-recovery attack if the original cipher is secure against such an attack. Our analysis is based on the general structure of elastic block ciphers (i.e., the network's structure, the composition methods between rounds in the network and the keying methodology) and is independent of the specific cipher.