Impossible-differential attacks on large-block Rijndael

  • Authors:
  • Jorge Nakahara;Ivan Carlos Pavão

  • Affiliations:
  • UNISANTOS, Brazil;UNISANTOS, Brazil

  • Venue:
  • ISC'07 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Information Security
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

This paper reports impossible-differential (ID) attacks on reduced-round versions of the Rijndael cipher with text blocks larger than 128 bits. These attacks follow the framework of the attacks by Biham-Keller and Cheon et al. on the AES, and reach up to seven rounds of large-block Rijndael variants. Even though these ciphers are not standardized as FIPS, like the AES, it is important to evaluate the security of the other Rijndael versions since they provide larger internal states when used as primitives for the construction of stream ciphers and hash functions. The main contributions of this paper are longer ID distinguishers found for large-block Rijndael versions, compared to the ones used for the AES.