Token-controlled public key encryption in the standard model

  • Authors:
  • Sherman S. M. Chow

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer Science, Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences, New York University, NY

  • Venue:
  • ISC'07 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Information Security
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

In many financial or legal scenarios (such as trading stocks, wills and safe-deposit boxes), we want to ensure that a certain task (reading the buy/sell instruction, obtaining the property, or opening the box in emergencies respectively) cannot be performed until a certain time or a certain pre-defined condition occurs. Token-controlled public key encryption (TCE), introduced in [2], is a handy tool for these situations. Roughly speaking, messages are encrypted by a public key together with a secret token in TCE, such that the receiver holding the corresponding private key cannot decrypt until the token is released. TCE is also useful in rapid distribution of information and sealed-bid auctions, etc. In Financial Cryptography 2006, Galindo and Herranz [15] proposed a generic construction of TCE in the random oracle model. However, we show that it is insecure against insider attack, namely, a malicious user without the token can learn partial information about the message. We propose a strengthened definition of security, and also new privacy requirements. It turns out that [15] is also insecure against outsider attack in our new definition. We then give a new generic construction provably secure in the standard model, which is nearly as efficient as a standard public key encryption scheme.