Detecting prefix hijackings in the internet with argus

  • Authors:

  • Xingang Shi;Yang Xiang;Zhiliang Wang;Xia Yin;Jianping Wu

  • Affiliations:

  • Institute for Network Sciences and Cyberspace, Tsinghua University, Beijng, China;Department of Computer Science & Technology, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China;Institute for Network Sciences and Cyberspace, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China;Department of Computer Science & Technology, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China;Institute for Network Sciences and Cyberspace, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Internet measurement conference
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) plays a critical role in the Internet inter-domain routing reliability. Invalid routes generated by mis-configurations or forged by malicious attacks may hijack the traffic and devastate the Internet routing system, but it is unlikely that a secure BGP can be deployed in the near future to completely prevent them. Although many hijacking detection systems have been developed, they more or less have weaknesses such as long detection delay, high false alarm rate and deployment difficulty, and no systematic detection results have been studied. This paper proposes Argus, an agile system that can accurately detect prefix hijackings and deduce the underlying cause of route anomalies in a very fast way. Argus is based on correlating the control and data plane information closely and pervasively, and has been continuously monitoring the Internet for more than one year. During this period, around 40K routing anomalies were detected, from which 220 stable prefix hijackings were identified. Our analysis on these events shows that, hijackings that have only been theoretically studied before do exist in the Internet. Although the frequency of new hijackings is nearly stable, more specific prefixes are hijacked more frequently. Around 20% of the hijackings last less than ten minutes, and some can pollute 90% of the Internet in less than two minutes. These characteristics make \emph{Argus} especially useful in practice. We further analyze some representative cases in detail to help increase the understanding of prefix hijackings in the Internet.