A systematic elaboration of safety requirements in the avionic domain

  • Authors:
  • Antoaneta Kondeva;Martin Wassmuth;Andreas Mitschke

  • Affiliations:
  • EADS Innovation Works, EADS Deutschland GmbH, Ottobrunn, Germany;EADS Innovation Works, EADS Deutschland GmbH, Ottobrunn, Germany;EADS Innovation Works, EADS Deutschland GmbH, Ottobrunn, Germany

  • Venue:
  • SAFECOMP'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

Avionic safety standards such as ARP4754A, DO-178B, and DO-254 specifying the development, validation and verification processes do not provide an unambiguous guideline for system developers, refining ARP4754A system requirements down to DO-178B or DO-254 specific items. Consequently, tracing the high-level system safety requirements down to safety item requirements of the individual system components is extremely difficult and error-prone. Today, the refinement of system safety requirements and their allocation to items, that shall realize them, is done mostly ad-hoc. This utilized ad-hoc approach is due to a lack of systematic elaboration methodologies. In this paper we advocate an approach that explicitly specifies the transition from abstract system requirements to concrete item requirements.