JFlow: practical mostly-static information flow control
Proceedings of the 26th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
A sound type system for secure flow analysis
Journal of Computer Security
Certification of programs for secure information flow
Communications of the ACM
A lattice model of secure information flow
Communications of the ACM
Information flow inference for ML
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
A Per Model of Secure Information Flow in Sequential Programs
Higher-Order and Symbolic Computation
Probabilistic Noninterference for Multi-Threaded Programs
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Secure Information Flow and Pointer Confinement in a Java-like Language
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A New Type System for Secure Information Flow
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Secure Information Flow by Self-Composition
CSFW '04 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Type-based information flow analysis for the π-calculus
Acta Informatica - Special issue: Types in concurrency. Part II , Guest Editor: R. De Nicola, D. Sangiorgi
On flow-sensitive security types
Conference record of the 33rd ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Information-Flow Security for Interactive Programs
CSFW '06 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Improved typings for probabilistic noninterference in a multi-threaded language
Journal of Computer Security
Secure information flow for a concurrent language with scheduling
Journal of Computer Security - Formal Methods in Security Engineering Workshop (FMSE 04)
Termination-Insensitive Noninterference Leaks More Than Just a Bit
ESORICS '08 Proceedings of the 13th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
Dynamic vs. Static Flow-Sensitive Security Analysis
CSF '10 Proceedings of the 2010 23rd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Secure information flow as a safety problem
SAS'05 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Static Analysis
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This paper presents an approach to enforce information flow policies using a three-valued type-based analysis on a core imperative language. Our analysis aims first at reducing false positives generated by static analysis, and second at preparing for instrumentation. False positives arise in the analysis of real computing systems when some information is missing at compile time, for example the name of a file, and consequently, its security level. The key idea of our approach is to distinguish between negative and may responses. Instead of rejecting in the latter cases, we type instructions with an additional type, unknown, indicating uncertainty, possibly preparing for a light instrumentation. During the static analysis step, the may responses are identified and annotated with the unknown security type, while the positive and negative responses are treated as is usually done. This work is done in preparation of a hybrid security enforcement mechanismWe prove that our type system is sound by showing that it satisfies non-interference. The novelty is the handling of three security types, but we also treat variables and channels in a special way. Programs interact via communication channels. Secrecy levels are associated to channels rather than to variables whose security levels change according to the information they store.