Communications of the ACM
Chord: A scalable peer-to-peer lookup service for internet applications
Proceedings of the 2001 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Kademlia: A Peer-to-Peer Information System Based on the XOR Metric
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
Pastry: Scalable, Decentralized Object Location, and Routing for Large-Scale Peer-to-Peer Systems
Middleware '01 Proceedings of the IFIP/ACM International Conference on Distributed Systems Platforms Heidelberg
Measurement, modeling, and analysis of a peer-to-peer file-sharing workload
SOSP '03 Proceedings of the nineteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
OpenDHT: a public DHT service and its uses
Proceedings of the 2005 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
File System Design with Assured Delete
SISW '05 Proceedings of the Third IEEE International Security in Storage Workshop
SSYM'96 Proceedings of the 6th conference on USENIX Security Symposium, Focusing on Applications of Cryptography - Volume 6
Proceedings of the 7th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
Vanish: increasing data privacy with self-destructing data
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
A Secure Self-Destructing Scheme for Electronic Data
EUC '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Embedded and Ubiquitous Computing
Achieving fine-grained access control for secure data sharing on cloud servers
Concurrency and Computation: Practice & Experience
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As more and more services and applications are emerging in the Internet, exposing sensitive electronic data in the Internet has become easier. We propose a secure self-destructing scheme for electronic data (SSDD), which can protect a user@?s sensitive electronic data by making the sensitive data automatically destructed after a period of time. Specifically, we first encrypt the data into a ciphertext. Then, we associate the ciphertext, and extract a part of the ciphertext to make it incomplete. Finally, we distribute both the decryption key and the extracted ciphertext into a distributed hash table (DHT) network. To recover the plaintext, both the decryption key and the extracted ciphertext should be obtained from the DHT network before the pre-configured period of time. By security analysis, we show that the SSDD scheme can resist against not only the attacks in the DHT network, but also the traditional cryptanalysis and the brute-force attack.