Security analysis of a secure and practical dynamic identity-based remote user authentication scheme

  • Authors:
  • Mo-han Zhang;Chen-guang Yang;Ding Wang

  • Affiliations:
  • College of Software Engineering, Sichuan University, Chengdu City, China;College of Software Engineering, Sichuan University, Chengdu City, China;Automobile Sergeant Institute of PLA, Bengbu City, China

  • Venue:
  • WISM'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Web Information Systems and Mining
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

In 2005, Lee et al. proposed a secure smart card based remote user authentication scheme to improve the security of Chien et al.'s scheme. More recently, Sood et al. pointed out that Lee et al.'s scheme is still vulnerable to the reflection attack, off-line password guessing attack, user impersonation attack and fails to preserve user anonymity. Consequently, Sood et al. proposed a more secure remote user authentication scheme, which is an improvement over Lee et al.'s scheme to overcome their security drawbacks. In this study, however, we find that Sood et al.'s scheme still cannot achieve the claimed security and report its following flaws: (1) It fails to preserve user anonymity under their non-tamper resistance assumption of the smart card; (2) It cannot withstand stolen-verifier attack. The proposed cryptanalysis discourages any use of the scheme for practical applications.