Unaligned rebound attack: application to keccak

  • Authors:
  • Alexandre Duc;Jian Guo;Thomas Peyrin;Lei Wei

  • Affiliations:
  • Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Swizerland;Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore;Nanyang Technological University, Singapore;Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

  • Venue:
  • FSE'12 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Fast Software Encryption
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

We analyze the internal permutations of Keccak, one of the NIST SHA-3 competition finalists, in regard to differential properties. By carefully studying the elements composing those permutations, we are able to derive most of the best known differential paths for up to 5 rounds. We use these differential paths in a rebound attack setting and adapt this powerful freedom degrees utilization in order to derive distinguishers for up to 8 rounds of the internal permutations of the submitted version of Keccak. The complexity of the 8 round distinguisher is 2491.47. Our results have been implemented and verified experimentally on a small version of Keccak.