An automata-theoretic approach to linear temporal logic
Proceedings of the VIII Banff Higher order workshop conference on Logics for concurrency : structure versus automata: structure versus automata
Checking Finite Traces Using Alternating Automata
Formal Methods in System Design
Automata-based confidentiality monitoring
ASIAN'06 Proceedings of the 11th Asian computing science conference on Advances in computer science: secure software and related issues
Comparing LTL Semantics for Runtime Verification
Journal of Logic and Computation
Dynamic vs. Static Flow-Sensitive Security Analysis
CSF '10 Proceedings of the 2010 23rd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
From dynamic to static and back: riding the roller coaster of information-flow control research
PSI'09 Proceedings of the 7th international Andrei Ershov Memorial conference on Perspectives of Systems Informatics
Model checking information flow in reactive systems
VMCAI'12 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation
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We present a framework for monitoring information flow in security-critical reactive systems, such as communication protocols, cell phone apps, document servers and web browsers. The secrecy requirements in such systems typically vary over time in response to the interaction with the environment. Standard notions of secrecy, like noninterference, must therefore be extended by specifying precisely when and under what conditions a particular event needs to remain secret. Our framework is based on the temporal logic SecLTL, which combines the standard temporal operators of linear-time temporal logic with the modal Hide operator for the specification of information flow properties. We present a first monitoring algorithm for SecLTL specifications, based on a translation of SecLTL formulas to alternating automata, and identify open research questions and directions for future work.