Convergence of ordered improvement paths in generalized congestion games

Authors:
K. Ruben Brokkelkamp;Mees J. de Vries
Affiliations:
Korteweg---de Vries Institute, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands;Korteweg---de Vries Institute, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands
Venue:
SAGT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Algorithmic Game Theory
Year:
2012

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Abstract

We consider generalized congestion games, a class of games in which players share a set of strategies and the payoff functions depend only on the chosen strategy and the number of players playing the same strategy, in such a way that fewer such players results in greater payoff. In these games we consider improvement paths. As shown by Milchtaich [2] such paths may be infinite. We consider paths in which the players deviate in a specific order, and prove that ordered best response improvement paths are finite, while ordered better response improvement paths may still be infinite.