Efficient and timely mutual authentication
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Some new attacks upon security protocols
CSFW '96 Proceedings of the 9th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Generating Formal Cryptographic Protocol Specifications
SP '94 Proceedings of the 1994 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
On the semantics of Alice&Bob specifications of security protocols
Theoretical Computer Science - Automated reasoning for security protocol analysis
A formal semantics for protocol narrations
Theoretical Computer Science
Chosen-name Attacks: An Overlooked Class of Type-flaw Attacks
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Compiling and securing cryptographic protocols
Information Processing Letters
Deciding recognizability under Dolev-Yao intruder model
ISC'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information security
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As protocol narrations are widely used to describe security protocols, efforts have been made to formalize or devise semantics for them. An important, but largely neglected, question is whether or not the formalism faithfully accounts for the attacker's view. Several attempts have been made in the literature to recover the attacker's view. They, however, are rather restricted in scope and quite complex. This greatly impedes the ability of protocol verification tools to detect intricate attacks. In this paper, we establish a faithful view of the attacker based on rigorous, yet intuitive, interpretations of exchanged messages. This gives us a new way to look at attacks and protocol implementations. Specifically, we identify two types of attacks that can be thawed through adjusting the protocol implementation; and show that such an ideal implementation does not always exist. Overall, the obtained attacker's view provides a path to more secure protocol designs and implementations.