Public-key cryptosystems provably secure against chosen ciphertext attacks
STOC '90 Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
SIAM Journal on Computing
Non-Malleable Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge and Adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext Security
FOCS '99 Proceedings of the 40th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A Simpler Construction of CCA2-Secure Public-Key Encryption under General Assumptions
Journal of Cryptology
Intrusion-Resilient Secret Sharing
FOCS '07 Proceedings of the 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Simultaneous Hardcore Bits and Cryptography against Memory Attacks
TCC '09 Proceedings of the 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference on Theory of Cryptography
On cryptography with auxiliary input
Proceedings of the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Public-Key Cryptosystems Resilient to Key Leakage
CRYPTO '09 Proceedings of the 29th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Leakage-Resilient Public-Key Cryptography in the Bounded-Retrieval Model
CRYPTO '09 Proceedings of the 29th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Signature Schemes with Bounded Leakage Resilience
ASIACRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Intrusion-resilient key exchange in the bounded retrieval model
TCC'07 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Theory of cryptography
Public-key encryption schemes with auxiliary inputs
TCC'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Theory of Cryptography
Public-Key encryption in the bounded-retrieval model
EUROCRYPT'10 Proceedings of the 29th Annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
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We consider public key encryption (PKE) schemes with auxiliary input, that is, the adversary is given any computationally uninvertible function of the secret key. Previous result only achieves security under chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA). In this paper, we construct public key encryption schemes that are secure under chosen-ciphertext attacks even when the adversary is given any computationally uninvertible function of the secret key as an auxiliary input. We follow the Naor–Yung ‘double encryption’ paradigm and generally transform any chosen-plaintext attack secure public key encryption into a chosen-ciphertext attack secure one in the auxiliary input model. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.