Secure Aggregation for Wireless Networks
SAINT-W '03 Proceedings of the 2003 Symposium on Applications and the Internet Workshops (SAINT'03 Workshops)
Secure hierarchical in-network aggregation in sensor networks
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Wireless Sensor Networks: Technology, Protocols, and Applications
Wireless Sensor Networks: Technology, Protocols, and Applications
Aggregate designated verifier signatures and application to secure routing
International Journal of Security and Networks
Aggregate and verifiably encrypted signatures from bilinear maps
EUROCRYPT'03 Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques
Aggregate message authentication codes
CT-RSA'08 Proceedings of the 2008 The Cryptopgraphers' Track at the RSA conference on Topics in cryptology
History-free aggregate message authentication codes
SCN'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Security and cryptography for networks
Fundamentals of Wireless Sensor Networks: Theory and Practice
Fundamentals of Wireless Sensor Networks: Theory and Practice
Unrestricted aggregate signatures
ICALP'07 Proceedings of the 34th international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
MAC aggregation protocols resilient to DoS attacks
International Journal of Security and Networks
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Wireless sensor networks (WSN) collect and report measurements, such as temperature, to a central node. Because sensors are usually low-powered devices, data is transmitted hop-by-hop, through neighboring nodes, before it reaches the destination. Each nodes' messages are authenticated with a MAC (Message Authentication Code), keyed with a key known to the generating sensor and the control node. Because transmission channel capacity is often small, MACs represent a significant overhead. Indeed, a typical 128-bit MAC is as much as an order of magnitude larger than the data it authenticates --- a temperature or consumption reading, even with a timestamp, can be stored in 10-15 bits. To mitigate these overheads, methods to compute aggregate MACs, of length much shorter than the concatenation of constituent MACs, were proposed. Unfortunately, known MAC aggregation techniques require that any message may not appear twice in the aggregate MAC. This is entrenched both in the definitions and constructions/proofs. This is a significant impediment in many typical practical deployments of WSNs. Indeed, one typical message relay strategy, flooding, relies on each node retransmitting received packets to all neighbors, almost certainly causing message repetition and inability to aggregate MACs. Further, we are not aware of any WSN protocols that guarantee non-duplication of messages. We propose a simple and very practical new way of MAC aggregation which allows message duplicates, and hence is usable in many more deployment scenarios. We derive a new security definition of this type of aggregate MAC, and discuss several variants of our construction and additional benefits such as Denial-of-Service resilience.