Perfectly secure message transmission
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Efficient perfectly secure message transmission in synchronous networks
Information and Computation
Asymptotically optimal covering designs
Journal of Combinatorial Theory Series A
Communications of the ACM
On perfectly secure communication over arbitrary networks
Proceedings of the twenty-first annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Perfectly Secure Message Transmission Revisited
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Factoring polynomials over large finite fields*
SYMSAC '71 Proceedings of the second ACM symposium on Symbolic and algebraic manipulation
Secure Hypergraphs: Privacy from Partial Broadcast
SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics
Security and Trust for the Norwegian E-Voting Pilot Project E-valg 2011
NordSec '09 Proceedings of the 14th Nordic Conference on Secure IT Systems: Identity and Privacy in the Internet Age
Almost Secure (1-Round, n-Channel) Message Transmission Scheme
Information Theoretic Security
How to break a practical MIX and design a new one
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Truly efficient 2-round perfectly secure message transmission scheme
EUROCRYPT'08 Proceedings of the theory and applications of cryptographic techniques 27th annual international conference on Advances in cryptology
Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGACT-SIGOPS symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Secure message transmission in asynchronous networks
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
AFRICACRYPT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Cryptology in Africa
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Perfectly secure message transmission (PSMT) schemes have been studied in the field of cryptography for nearly 20 years. In this paper we introduce a new aspect to PSMT. We consider the case when the hardware/software used by the receiver might be corrupted by the adversary. To address this, we replace the receiver by a human (the dual of this is when the sender is a human). Because of this, any proposed protocols should be computationally efficient for a human to carry out. Additionally, they should be as simple as possible, requiring minimal amount of thought and effort for someone to use them correctly. Taking the above into consideration, we propose two different constructions of such protocols. These have been designed to be secure and to be usable - so as to be easy and accurate when human parties use them. Experiments were carried out with human participants to evaluate what humans can compute.