CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing
CRYPTO '01 Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
New traitor tracing schemes using bilinear map
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Digital rights management
A Novel Stopping Criterion for Turbo Decoding
ICICIC '06 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Innovative Computing, Information and Control - Volume 1
Identity-based key agreement protocols from pairings
International Journal of Information Security
Traitor tracing with constant size ciphertext
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
EUROCRYPT'91 Proceedings of the 10th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Identity-based traitor tracing
PKC'07 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Practice and theory in public-key cryptography
Public traceability in traitor tracing schemes
EUROCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Fully collusion resistant traitor tracing with short ciphertexts and private keys
EUROCRYPT'06 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on The Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Pairing-based public key systems have recently received much attention because bilinear property contributes to the designs of many cryptographic schemes. In 2002, Mitsunari et al. proposed the first pairing-based traitor tracing scheme with constant-size ciphertexts and private keys. However, their scheme has been shown to be insecure for providing traitor tracing functionality. Recently, many researches still try to propose efficient pairing-based traitor tracing schemes in terms of ciphertext and private key sizes. In this paper, we present a security claim for the design of pairing-based traitor tracing schemes. For a pairing-based traitor tracing scheme with constant-size ciphertexts and private keys, if the decryption key is obtained by some pairing operations in pairing-based public key systems, the scheme will suffer from a linear attack and cannot provide the traitor tracing functionality. Finally, we apply our security claim to attack a pairing-based traitor tracing scheme proposed by Yang et al. to demonstrate our result. Our security claim can offer a notice and direction for designing pairing-based traitor tracing schemes. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.