Optical Fault Induction Attacks
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
The Key and IV Setup of the Stream Ciphers HC-256 and HC-128
NSWCTC '09 Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Networks Security, Wireless Communications and Trusted Computing - Volume 02
A Cache Timing Analysis of HC-256
Selected Areas in Cryptography
Improved Distinguishing Attacks on HC-256
IWSEC '09 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Security: Advances in Information and Computer Security
On the importance of checking cryptographic protocols for faults
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
A theoretical analysis of the structure of HC-128
IWSEC'11 Proceedings of the 6th International conference on Advances in information and computer security
Cache attacks and countermeasures: the case of AES
CT-RSA'06 Proceedings of the 2006 The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA conference on Topics in Cryptology
Improved distinguishers for HC-128
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Differential fault analysis of HC-128
AFRICACRYPT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Cryptology in Africa
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Side channel attacks are extremely implementation specific. An attack is tailor-made for a specific cipher algorithm implemented in a specific model. A natural question is: what is the effect of a side channel technique on a variant of the cipher algorithm implemented in a similar model? The motivation for such an investigation is to study the feasibility of using a cipher variant as a mode of recovering from a successful side channels attack. As a case study, we consider the HC series of stream ciphers, viz., HC-128 and HC-256. We extend the HC-128 fault attack and the HC-256 cache analysis onto the HC-256 and HC-128 ciphers respectively under similar models. The techniques applied on one variant is not trivially translatable to the other and the issue was left open until the current work. We propose a technique to recover half the state of HC-128 using cache analysis, which can be cascaded with the differential attack towards a full state recovery and hence key recovery. Similarly, we analyze the state leakage of HC-256 under differential fault attack model to achieve partial state recovery.