SOSP '01 Proceedings of the eighteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
On selfish routing in internet-like environments
Proceedings of the 2003 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
The Mathematics of Internet Congestion Control (Systems and Control: Foundations and Applications)
The Mathematics of Internet Congestion Control (Systems and Control: Foundations and Applications)
On the interaction of multiple overlay routing
Performance Evaluation - Performance 2005
Can ISPS and P2P users cooperate for improved performance?
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
REPLEX: dynamic traffic engineering based on wardrop routing policies
CoNEXT '06 Proceedings of the 2006 ACM CoNEXT conference
P4p: provider portal for applications
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2008 conference on Data communication
Taming the torrent: a practical approach to reducing cross-isp traffic in peer-to-peer systems
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2008 conference on Data communication
A game-theoretic analysis of the implications of overlay network traffic on ISP peering
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Cooperative content distribution and traffic engineering in an ISP network
Proceedings of the eleventh international joint conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Cutting the electric bill for internet-scale systems
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2009 conference on Data communication
Traffic engineering with traditional IP routing protocols
IEEE Communications Magazine
Towards Robust Multi-Layer Traffic Engineering: Optimization of Congestion Control and Routing
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Traffic engineering with MPLS in the Internet
IEEE Network: The Magazine of Global Internetworking
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In this paper, we explore the interaction between traffic engineering and the users of a network. Because a traffic engineer may be unaware of the structure of content distribution systems or overlay networks, his management of the network does not fully anticipate how traffic might change as a result of his actions. Content distribution systems that assign servers at the application level can respond very rapidly to changes in the routing of the network. Consequently, the traffic engineer's decisions may not be applied to the intended traffic. We use a game-theoretic framework in which infinitesimal users of a network select the source of content, and the traffic engineer decides how the traffic will route through the network. We formulate a game and prove the existence of equilibria. Additionally, we present a setting in which equilibria are socially optimal, essentially unique, and stable. Conditions under which efficiency loss may be bounded are presented, and the results are extended to the cases of general overlay networks and multiple autonomous systems.