Controlling high bandwidth aggregates in the network
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Incentive-based modeling and inference of attacker intent, objectives, and strategies
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
RINSE: The Real-Time Immersive Network Simulation Environment for Network Security Exercises
Proceedings of the 19th Workshop on Principles of Advanced and Distributed Simulation
An Introduction to Copulas (Springer Series in Statistics)
An Introduction to Copulas (Springer Series in Statistics)
Survey of network-based defense mechanisms countering the DoS and DDoS problems
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Security games with incomplete information
ICC'09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE international conference on Communications
Towards a bayesian network game framework for evaluating DDoS attacks and defense
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
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Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks on the Internet are used by attackers to be a nuisance, make a political statement (e.g. the 2009 attack against Estonia), or as a weapon of an Internet extortionist. Effective defense against these is a crucial study area, where advanced simulation techniques play a critical role, because of the enormous number of events involved. This paper considers a methodology for evaluating a game-theoretic defense against DDoS. We first describe a basic form of the defense, note the performance limitations suffered by a naive implementation, and then consider methodologies in which a parallelized approach may accelerate performance.