Conditioning Prices on Purchase History
Marketing Science
Marketing Science
The Market Structure for Internet Search Engines
Journal of Management Information Systems
How much can behavioral targeting help online advertising?
Proceedings of the 18th international conference on World wide web
Large-scale behavioral targeting
Proceedings of the 15th ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining
Gender demographic targeting in sponsored search
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
Online advertising, behavioral targeting, and privacy
Communications of the ACM
For sale : your data: by : you
Proceedings of the 10th ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks
Hide and Seek: Costly Consumer Privacy in a Market with Repeat Purchases
Marketing Science
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We analyze the value to e-commerce website operators of offering privacy options to users, e.g., of allowing users to opt out of ad targeting. In particular, we assume that site operators have some control over the cost that a privacy option imposes on users and ask when it is to their advantage to make such costs low. We consider both the case of a single site and the case of multiple sites that compete both for users who value privacy highly and for users who value it less. One of our main results in the case of a single site is that, under normally distributed utilities, if a privacy-sensitive user is worth at least $\sqrt{2} - 1$ times as much to advertisers as a privacy-insensitive user, the site operator should strive to make the cost of a privacy option as low as possible. In the case of multiple sites, we show how a Prisoner's-Dilemma situation can arise: In the equilibrium in which both sites are obliged to offer a privacy option at minimal cost, both sites obtain lower revenue than they would if they colluded and neither offered a privacy option.