The price of anarchy for selfish ring routing is two

Authors:
Xujin Chen;Benjamin Doerr;Xiaodong Hu;Weidong Ma;Rob van Stee;Carola Winzen
Affiliations:
Institute of Applied Mathematics, AMSS, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China;Max Planck Institute for Informatics, Saarbrücken, Germany;Institute of Applied Mathematics, AMSS, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China;Institute of Applied Mathematics, AMSS, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China;Max Planck Institute for Informatics, Saarbrücken, Germany;Max Planck Institute for Informatics, Saarbrücken, Germany
Venue:
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Year:
2012

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Abstract

We analyze the network congestion game with atomic players, asymmetric strategies, and the maximum latency among all players as social cost. This important social cost function is much less understood than the average latency. We show that the price of anarchy is at most two, when the network is a ring and the link latencies are linear. Our bound is tight. This is the first sharp bound for the maximum latency objective.