Mining the network value of customers
Proceedings of the seventh ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining
Maximizing the spread of influence through a social network
Proceedings of the ninth ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining
Aggregating inconsistent information: ranking and clustering
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics
The Minimum Feedback Arc Set Problem is NP-Hard for Tournaments
Combinatorics, Probability and Computing
Optimal marketing strategies over social networks
Proceedings of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web
Beating the Random Ordering is Hard: Inapproximability of Maximum Acyclic Subgraph
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Computing slater rankings using similarities among candidates
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Pricing Strategies for Viral Marketing on Social Networks
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Optimal auctions with positive network externalities
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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Firms have ever-increasing amounts of information about possible customers available to them; furthermore, they are increasingly able to push offers to them rather than having to passively wait for a consumer to initiate contact. This opens up enormous new opportunities for intelligent marketing. In this paper, we consider the limit case in which the firm can predict consumers' preferences and relationships to each other perfectly, and has perfect control over when it makes offers to consumers. We focus on how to optimally introduce a new product into a social network of agents, when that product has significant externalities. We propose a general model to capture this problem, and prove that there is no polynomial-time approximation unless P=NP. However, in the special case where agents' relationships are symmetric and externalities are positive, we show that the problem can be solved in polynomial time.