A leakage-resilient zero knowledge proof for lattice problem

Authors:
Yang Liu;Hongda Li;Qihua Niu
Affiliations:
State Key Laboratory of Information Security Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China;State Key Laboratory of Information Security Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China;State Key Laboratory of Information Security Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
Venue:
CSS'12 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Cyberspace Safety and Security
Year:
2012

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Abstract

Leakage-resilient cryptographic protocols have recently been evolving intensively, studying the question of designing protocol that maintain security even in the presence of side-channel attacks. Under leakage assumption(the verifier uses side-channel attacks to obtain some information about the secret state of the prover), the known zero knowledge protocol may not preserve zero knowledge any more. Garg et.al. first studied leakage-resilient zero knowledge and presented an excellent construction for NP. Unfortunately, the definition is not suitable for honest verifier leakage-resilient zero knowledge. In this paper, we give a new definition of leakage-resilient zero knowledge and construct a leakage-resilient zero knowledge proof for approximate version of the closest vector problem(GAPCVPγ). We also give a definition of leakage-resilient bit commitment scheme.