SPTrack: visual analysis of information flows within SELinux policies and attack logs

  • Authors:
  • Patrice Clemente;Bangaly Kaba;Jonathan Rouzaud-Cornabas;Marc Alexandre;Guillaume Aujay

  • Affiliations:
  • ENSI de Bourges --- LIFO, Bourges, France;ENSI de Bourges --- LIFO, Bourges, France;LIP --- INRIA --- ENS Lyon, Lyon, France;ENSI de Bourges --- LIFO, Bourges, France;ENSI de Bourges --- LIFO, Bourges, France

  • Venue:
  • AMT'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Active Media Technology
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

Analyzing and administrating system security policies is difficult as policies become larger and more complex every day. The paper present work toward analyzing security policies and sessions in terms of security properties. Our intuition was that combining both visualization tools that could benefit from the expert's eyes, and software analysis abilities, should lead to a new interesting way to study and manage security policies as well as users' sessions. Rather than trying to mine large and complex policies to find possible flaws within, work may concentrate on which potential flaws are really exploited by attackers. Actually, the paper presents some methods and tools to visualize and manipulate large SELinux policies, with algorithms allowing to search for paths, such as information flows within policies. The paper also introduces a complementary original approach to analyze and visualize real attack logs as session graphs or information flow graphs, or even aggregated multiple-sessions graphs. Our wishes is that in the future, when those tools will be mature enough, security administrator can then confront the statical security view given by the security policy analysis and the dynamical and real-world view given by the parts of attacks that most often occurred.