Consistency of decision processes
Annals of Operations Research
Transitivity of fuzzy relations and rational choice
Annals of Operations Research
Fuzzy preference structures without incomparability
Fuzzy Sets and Systems
Weak and strong fuzzy interval orders
Fuzzy Sets and Systems
General transitivity conditions for fuzzy reciprocal preference matrices
Fuzzy Sets and Systems - Special issue: Preference modelling and applications
Additive decomposition of fuzzy pre-orders
Fuzzy Sets and Systems
Choosing OWA operator weights in the field of Social Choice
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Fuzzy social choice: a selective retrospect
Soft Computing - A Fusion of Foundations, Methodologies and Applications - Special issue on BISCSE 2005 " Forging the Frontiers" Part II
On the compositional characterization of complete fuzzy pre-orders
Fuzzy Sets and Systems
Group decision making with incomplete fuzzy linguistic preference relations
International Journal of Intelligent Systems
Modeling rationality in a linguistic framework
Fuzzy Sets and Systems
IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems
Transitivity frameworks for reciprocal relations: cycle-transitivity versus FG-transitivity
Fuzzy Sets and Systems
Similarity relations and fuzzy orderings
Information Sciences: an International Journal
On the cycle-transitivity of the mutual rank probability relation of a poset
Fuzzy Sets and Systems
Transitivity Bounds in Additive Fuzzy Preference Structures
IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems
Consensus measures constructed from aggregation functions and fuzzy implications
Knowledge-Based Systems
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A common criticism to simple majority voting rule is the slight support that such rule demands to declare an alternative as a winner. Among the distinct majority rules used for diminishing this handicap, we focus on majorities based on difference in support. With these majorities, voters are allowed to show intensities of preference among alternatives through reciprocal preference relations. These majorities also take into account the difference in support between alternatives in order to select the winner. In this paper we have provided some necessary and sufficient conditions for ensuring transitive collective decisions generated by majorities based on difference in support for all the profiles of individual reciprocal preference relations. These conditions involve both the thresholds of support and some individual rationality assumptions that are related to transitivity in the framework of reciprocal preference relations.