Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Economics of peer-to-peer systems
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eBay in the Sky: strategy-proof wireless spectrum auctions
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Spatio-temporal spectrum modeling: Taxonomy and economic evaluation of context acquisition
Telecommunications Policy
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This paper considers an approach for dynamic short-term spectrum leasing in TV white spaces (TVWS) using an on-line auction. The secondary spectrum market discussed here is organized by a central entity called the spectrum broker. The auctioned spectrum appears in blocks of available DVB-T channels with some transmit power constraints set-up to protect the primary users (DVB-T receivers). The bidders are institutional spectrum operators (telecommunication companies or service providers), operating in a given area. These players are characterized by heterogeneous demands concerning the spectrum bandwidth, the operation period with temporarily-exclusive rights for using the spectrum and the transmit power needed for successful transmission. Thus, the auctioned objects are non-identical and present different value for different players. Two auction models are proposed. The first one is the simultaneous auction in time domain and combinatorial in frequency and power dimension. The second proposed auction is fully combinatorial. Simulations results are also provided showing effectiveness of the analyzed auctions (high spectrum utilization ratio) and relation between the players' satisfaction, their spectrum valuation and varying competition. Finally the guidelines concerning the spectrum auctions in TVWS for the policy makers are proposed.