On the security of tan et al. serverless RFID authentication and search protocols

  • Authors:
  • Masoumeh Safkhani;Pedro Peris-Lopez;Nasour Bagheri;Majid Naderi;Julio Cesar Hernandez-Castro

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Electrical Engineering, Iran University of Science and Technology (IUST), Tehran, Iran;Computer Security Lab (COSEC), Carlos III University of Madrid, Spain;Department of Electrical Engineering, Shahid Rajaee Teachers Training University, Tehran, Iran;Department of Electrical Engineering, Iran University of Science and Technology (IUST), Tehran, Iran;School of Computing, University of Portsmouth, UK

  • Venue:
  • RFIDSec'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Radio Frequency Identification: security and privacy issues
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the security of the mutual authentication and search protocols recently proposed by Tan et al. [20]. Our security analysis clearly highlights important security pitfalls in these. More precisely, privacy location of the tags' holder is compromised by the authentication protocol. Moreover, the static identifier which represents the most valuable information that a tag supposedly transmits in a secure way, can be exposed by an adversary when the authentication protocol is used in combination with one of the search protocols. Finally, we point out how the improved search protocols are vulnerable to traceability attacks, and show the way an attacker can impersonate a legitimate tag.