Communications of the ACM
Mix and Match: Secure Function Evaluation via Ciphertexts
ASIACRYPT '00 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Secret Handshakes from Pairing-Based Key Agreements
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications
Attribute-based encryption for fine-grained access control of encrypted data
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Secure attribute-based systems
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Defining Strong Privacy for RFID
PERCOMW '07 Proceedings of the Fifth IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops
How to Hash into Elliptic Curves
CRYPTO '09 Proceedings of the 29th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
ASIACRYPT'07 Proceedings of the Advances in Crypotology 13th international conference on Theory and application of cryptology and information security
Predicate encryption supporting disjunctions, polynomial equations, and inner products
EUROCRYPT'08 Proceedings of the theory and applications of cryptographic techniques 27th annual international conference on Advances in cryptology
Evaluating 2-DNF formulas on ciphertexts
TCC'05 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Theory of Cryptography
Fuzzy identity-based encryption
EUROCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
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RFID-based tag matching allows a reader Rk to determine whether two tags Ti and Tj store some attributes that jointly fulfill a boolean constraint. The challenge in designing a matching mechanism is tag privacy. While cheap tags are unable to perform any computation, matching has to be achieved without revealing the tags' attributes. In this paper, we present T-Match, a protocol for secure and privacy preserving RFID tag matching. T-Match involves a pair of tags Ti and Tj, a reader Rk, and a backend server S. To ensure tag privacy against Rk and S, T-Match employs a new technique based on secure two-party computation that prevents Rk and S from disclosing tag attributes. For tag privacy against eavesdroppers, each tag Ti in T-Match stores an IND-CPA encryption of its attribute. Such an encryption allows Rk to update the state of Ti by merely re-encrypting Ti's ciphertext. T-Match targets cheap tags that cannot perform any computation, but are only required to store 150 bytes.