Fast asynchronous Byzantine agreement with optimal resilience
STOC '93 Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Asynchronous secure computation
STOC '93 Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Bounds on information exchange for Byzantine agreement
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
On the complexity of verifiable secret sharing and multiparty computation
STOC '00 Proceedings of the thirty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Communications of the ACM
Asynchronous verifiable secret sharing and proactive cryptosystems
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Non-Interactive and Information-Theoretic Secure Verifiable Secret Sharing
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Proactive Secret Sharing Or: How to Cope With Perpetual Leakage
CRYPTO '95 Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
An asynchronous [(n - 1)/3]-resilient consensus protocol
PODC '84 Proceedings of the third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
APSS: proactive secret sharing in asynchronous systems
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Verifiable secret sharing and achieving simultaneity in the presence of faults
SFCS '85 Proceedings of the 26th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A practical scheme for non-interactive verifiable secret sharing
SFCS '87 Proceedings of the 28th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Proceedings of the twenty-seventh ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Improving the Round Complexity of VSS in Point-to-Point Networks
ICALP '08 Proceedings of the 35th international colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, Part II
Practical Anonymous Divisible E-Cash from Bounded Accumulators
Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Simple and efficient asynchronous byzantine agreement with optimal resilience
Proceedings of the 28th ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Distributed Key Generation for the Internet
ICDCS '09 Proceedings of the 2009 29th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
A threshold cryptosystem without a trusted party
EUROCRYPT'91 Proceedings of the 10th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
MPSS: Mobile Proactive Secret Sharing
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Computational verifiable secret sharing revisited
ASIACRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on The Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
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Verifiable secret sharing (VSS) is a vital primitive in secure distributed computing. It allows an untrusted dealer to verifiably share a secret among n parties in the presence of an adversary controlling at most t of them. VSS in the synchronous communication model has received tremendous attention in the cryptographic research community. Nevertheless, recent interest in deploying secure distributed computing over the Internet requires going beyond the synchronous model and thoroughly investigating VSS in the asynchronous communication model. In this work, we consider the communication complexity of asynchronous VSS in the computational setting for the optimal resilience of n=3t+1. The best known asynchronous VSS protocol by Cachin et al. has O(n2) message complexity and O(κn3) communication complexity, where κ is a security parameter. We close the linear complexity gap between these two measures for asynchronous VSS by presenting two protocols with O(n2) message complexity and O(κn2) communication complexity. Our first protocol satisfies the standard VSS definition, and can be used in stand-alone VSS scenarios as well as in applications such as Byzantine agreement. Our second and more intricate protocol satisfies a stronger VSS definition, and is useful in all VSS applications including multiparty computation and threshold cryptography.