ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
IRM Enforcement of Java Stack Inspection
SP '00 Proceedings of the 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Detours: binary interception of Win32 functions
WINSYM'99 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on USENIX Windows NT Symposium - Volume 3
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Apex: extending Android permission model and enforcement with user-defined runtime constraints
ASIACCS '10 Proceedings of the 5th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
CRePE: context-related policy enforcement for android
ISC'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information security
Aurasium: practical policy enforcement for Android applications
Security'12 Proceedings of the 21st USENIX conference on Security symposium
Dr. Android and Mr. Hide: fine-grained permissions in android applications
Proceedings of the second ACM workshop on Security and privacy in smartphones and mobile devices
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Inline reference monitoring instruments programs in order to enforce a security policy at runtime. This technique has become an essential tool to mitigate inherent security shortcomings of mobile platforms like Android. Unfortunately, rewriting all calls to security-relevant methods requires significant space and time, in particular if this process is performed on the phone. This work proposes a novel approach to inline reference monitoring that abstains from caller-site instrumentation even in the case where the monitored method is part of a sealed library. To that end we divert the control flow towards the security monitor by modifying references to security-relevant methods in the Dalvik Virtual Machine's internal bytecode representation. This method is similar in spirit to modifying function pointers and effectively allows callee-site rewriting. Our initial empirical evaluation demonstrates that this approach incurs minimal runtime overhead.