A cookbook for black-box separations and a recipe for UOWHFs

  • Authors:
  • Kfir Barhum;Thomas Holenstein

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer Science, ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland;Department of Computer Science, ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland

  • Venue:
  • TCC'13 Proceedings of the 10th theory of cryptography conference on Theory of Cryptography
  • Year:
  • 2013

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Abstract

We present a new framework for proving fully black-box separations and lower bounds. We prove a general theorem that facilitates the proofs of fully black-box lower bounds from a one-way function (OWF). Loosely speaking, our theorem says that in order to prove that a fully black-box construction does not securely construct a cryptographic primitive Q (e.g., a pseudo-random generator or a universal one-way hash function) from a OWF, it is enough to come up with a large enough set of functions $\mathcal{F}$ and a parameterized oracle (i.e., an oracle that is defined for every fε{0,1}n#8594;{0,1}n) such that $\mathcal{O}_{f}$ breaks the security of the construction when instantiated with f and the oracle satisfies two local properties. Our main application of the theorem is a lower bound of Ω(n/log(n)) on the number of calls made by any fully black-box construction of a universal one-way hash function (UOWHF) from a general one-way function. The bound holds even when the OWF is regular, in which case it matches to a recent construction of Barhum and Maurer [4].