Security without identification: transaction systems to make big brother obsolete
Communications of the ACM
How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
An Efficient Verifiable Encryption Scheme for Encryption of Discrete Logarithms
CARDIS '98 Proceedings of the The International Conference on Smart Card Research and Applications
Dynamic Accumulators and Application to Efficient Revocation of Anonymous Credentials
CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Proofs of Partial Knowledge and Simplified Design of Witness Hiding Protocols
CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A Statistically-Hiding Integer Commitment Scheme Based on Groups with Hidden Order
ASIACRYPT '02 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Efficient Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge Without Intractability Assumptions
PKC '00 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Anonymous credentials on a standard java card
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Practical revocable anonymous credentials
CMS'12 Proceedings of the 13th IFIP TC 6/TC 11 international conference on Communications and Multimedia Security
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Attribute-based credentials are cryptographic schemes designed to enhance user privacy. These schemes can be used for constructing anonymous proofs of the ownership of personal attributes. The attributes can represent any information about a user, e.g., age, citizenship or birthplace. The ownership of these attributes can be anonymously proven to verifiers without leaking any other information. The problem of existing credential schemes is that they do not allow the practical revocation of malicious or expired users when slow off-line devices (for example, smart-cards) are used for storing attributes. This prevents existing systems from being used on eIDs (electronic ID cards), employees' smart-cards or, for example, library access cards. In this paper, we propose a novel cryptographic scheme which allows both expired user revocation and de-anonymization of malicious users on commercially available smart-cards. In addition to the full cryptographic specification of the scheme, we also provide implementation results on .NET V2+ and MultOS smart-card platform.