Graph formation effects on social welfare and inequality in a networked resource game

Authors:
Zhuoshu Li;Yu-Han Chang;Rajiv Maheswaran
Affiliations:
Beihang University, Beijing, China, Information Sciences Institute, University of Southern California, CA;Information Sciences Institute, University of Southern California, CA;Information Sciences Institute, University of Southern California, CA
Venue:
SBP'13 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Social Computing, Behavioral-Cultural Modeling and Prediction
Year:
2013

Citing 9
Cited 0

Learning Bayesian Networks: The Combination of Knowledge and Statistical Data

Machine Learning
Multi-agent algorithms for solving graphical games

Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Nash equilibria in graphical games on trees revisited

EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Learning graphical game models

IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Detecting Social Situations from Interaction Geometry

SOCIALCOM '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE Second International Conference on Social Computing
Prisoner's Dilemma in Graphs with Heterogeneous Agents

SOCIALCOM '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE Second International Conference on Social Computing
Behavior Evolution and Event-Driven Growth Dynamics in Social Networks

SOCIALCOM '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE Second International Conference on Social Computing
Mining Temporal Subgraph Patterns in Heterogeneous Information Networks

SOCIALCOM '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE Second International Conference on Social Computing
Graphical models for game theory

UAI'01 Proceedings of the Seventeenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

We introduce the Networked Resource Game, a graphical game where players' actions are a set of resources that they can apply over links in a graph to form partnerships that yield rewards. This introduces a new constraint on actions over multiple links. We investigate several network formation algorithms and find bilateral coalition-proof equilibria for these games. We analyze the outcomes in terms of social welfare and inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, and show how graph formation affects these aspects of a networked economy.