Nonmonotonic inference based on expectations
Artificial Intelligence
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International Conference Logic at Work on Knowledge Representation and Reasoning Under Uncertainty, Logic at Work
Extensive games with possibly unaware players
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players
TARK '07 Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
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In game theory, the notion of expectation is made implicit. That is, most game-theoretic solution concepts, such as equilibrium, rationalizability, assume that agents expect one another to play their respective strategies according to the solution(s) induced by these solution concepts. This assumption limits the applicability of these solution concepts to many multi-agent systems situated in open and dynamic environments due to obvious reasons: agents being resource-bounded, agents being rational-bounded, and agents not knowing some relevant aspects of the game they are playing. In this paper, by making agents' expectations explicit we provide a generic and flexible framework to allow concepts and results of game theory to be more readily mapped to the reasoning and decision making mechanisms in multi-agent systems.