Checking safety properties using compositional reachability analysis
ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology (TOSEM)
Assumption Generation for Software Component Verification
Proceedings of the 17th IEEE international conference on Automated software engineering
Secure Control: Towards Survivable Cyber-Physical Systems
ICDCSW '08 Proceedings of the 2008 The 28th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops
Safe and Secure Networked Control Systems under Denial-of-Service Attacks
HSCC '09 Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Hybrid Systems: Computation and Control
Minimizing the TCB for securing SCADA systems
Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Workshop on Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Research
Using a high assurance TCB for infrastructure security
Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Workshop on Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Research
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Control systems are at the heart of many critical infrastructures. Malicious attacks on system controllers like SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) systems are serious threats to critical national infrastructures such as smart grids, nuclear power plants, or transportation systems. Analyzing and verifying the security of the control systems has increasingly become an important defense mechanism. This paper presents an approach that facilitates a semi-automated security system verification of control systems by a novel application of model checking, a technique traditionally used for automated software verification. The proposed approach is different from typical model-checking applications in that it has the ability to uncover missing safety and security properties that should be specified to prevent catastrophes caused by malicious acts. We describe the approach by illustrating its use in analyzing a cooling reactor system controller in a nuclear power plant system. The approach is general and applicable to SCADA and other control systems.